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This paper studies a vendor’s timing and pricing of a new product in the presence of an 
installed base.  Using a stylized model with overlapping generations of a durable product and 
heterogeneous consumers, we show that the valuation of former patrons toward the new 
product is dynamic over time.  Together with new customers who do not own the old product, 
such dynamic valuation leads to a demand structure that is more heterogeneous than those 
studied in the prior literature.  We found that the vendor would often prefer intertemporal but 
not static price discrimination in maximizing its profits.  Surprisingly, such intertemporal 
price discrimination is sometimes perfect in the sense that the vendor may capture all surplus 
from consumers.  We also show that the vendor would at times delay selling the new product 
so as to overcome the negative influences caused by time inconsistency and cannibalization.  
Overall, we found that the vendor’s equilibrium choices often result in socially inefficient 
outcomes, and upgrade pricing may not rectify such inefficiencies.  In fact, the vendor may 
even forgo using upgrade pricing in equilibrium.  Hence, direct price discrimination based on 
purchase history may lose its merit when a vendor dynamically prices a new product in view 
of an installed base of old products. 
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1. Introduction 
In many durable goods markets firms face consumers with different purchase histories.  The 
different purchase histories may arise because people exhibit different valuations toward the 
products, and so they may not buy the products at the same time.  Firms are often happy to 
sell products only to those people who value the products highly, because they may capture 
higher profits from such people than selling the products to all consumers at lower prices 
(Mussa and Rosen 1978; Stokey 1979; Moorthy 1984). 
  However, the firms’ decisions would become more complicated if new generations of 
durable products arrive at the market.  Suppose a durable good vendor faces a population of 
consumers who variously own / do not own a current-generation product.  A new generation 
with better quality has arrived, and the vendor can sell it to consumers without incurring 
significant costs.  When should the vendor sell the new product to consumers?  Should it 
target at people who own the old product, or new customers?  Should the vendor continue to 
sell the old product?  How should it set the prices? 
  The answers to these questions are not trivial because the vendor faces a significant 
cannibalization and time inconsistency problem.  As previous studies had characterized (e.g., 
Dhebar 1994; 1996; Fishman and Rob 2000), the existing installed base of the old product 
reduces some consumers’ need for the new product (a forward cannibalization effect).  At the 
same time, consumer anticipation of the new product makes continue selling the old product 
difficult for the vendor (a backward cannibalization effect).  In fact, consumers may “balk” if 
new generations of products are launched too rapidly (Dhebar 1996).   
  The previous studies have not considered the situation when the installed base is not 
complete in the sense that not all consumers own the old product (cf. Bayus 1992; Fishman 
and Rob 2000), and when the vendor can sell the new product at different time (cf. only in 
one specific period; e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998).  The incomplete   2
installed base facilitates selling both products in the market, and, compared with the case with 
full installed base, the vendor may face fewer balking consumers.  The option to sell the new 
product at different time periods makes intertemporal price discrimination feasible, but it re-
introduces time inconsistency.  The interaction of these two features gives rise to decision 
complexities that have not been not well explored in the prior literature. 
  In this study, we analyze the vendor’s timing and pricing decisions when it faces an 
installed base of the old product.  Our setting allows the vendor to decide whether, when, and 
how much to sell both the old and new products, and so it is more general than past studies 
which  ex ante fixed the product sequences (e.g., Moorthy and Png 1992; Dhebar 1994; 
Kornish 2001) or the time of introducing / selling new products (e.g., Waldman 1993; 1996a; 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998). 
  In particular, our model could accommodate two types of demand dynamics: first, 
former patrons (people who own the old product) exhibit an increasing willingness to buy the 
new product due to depreciation of the (old) product in hand.  Second, the service provided 
by the old stocks tends to make buying the new product less imminent for former patrons.  
Together with people who do not own the old product (i.e., potential new customers), the 
vendor faces an aggregate demand structure that is highly dynamic and heterogeneous.  Our 
equilibrium analysis shows that the vendor could use a variety of strategies, some of which 
being rather innovative, to respond to such a demand structure.   
  Our key findings are as follows.  First, we found that in most cases the vendor would 
not immediately sell the new product only to high valuation consumers who already own the 
old product.  So, for some multi-generation products that have not completely penetrated the 
market, the early buyers of new products may not always be the people who place the highest 
valuations on the products.  We also found that it is difficult for the vendor to practice static 
price discrimination by selling the entire product line to different consumer segments at the   3
same time (cf. Moorthy and Png 1992).  So, even without costs, durable goods vendors may 
sometimes not want to maintain all product vintages in a single period.   
  Second, we found a new equilibrium strategy which enables the vendor to extract all 
consumer surplus using (perfect) intertemporal price discrimination.  With this strategy, the 
vendor does not need to explicitly identify consumers.  It would sell the new product to low 
valuation consumers followed by high valuation consumers.  The price of the new product 
would increase over time, but consumers would self-select into the prices designed for them.  
Our analysis provides a new perspective on why some vendors would paradoxically increase 
the prices of their new products over time (cf. Bayus 1992). 
  Third, we found that the vendor would often delay selling the new product even when 
marginal cost is zero.  Contrary to existing literature, however, the motivation for such delays 
is not to soothe balking consumers or to accumulate future demand for the new product (e.g., 
Dhebar 1994; 1996).  Rather, they arise mostly because of time inconsistency.  Our research 
formally establishes “delayed introduction” as one strategy to address the time inconsistency 
problem (cf. Fishman and Rob 2000; see also, Waldman 2003). 
  Finally, we show that time inconsistency and cannibalization within the product line 
often cause the vendor to select equilibrium strategies that are socially inefficient.  Further, 
the inefficiency applies to all consumers (cf. only low valuation consumers, as in Mussa and 
Rosen 1978; Moorthy 1984; and Moorthy and Png 1992).  Upgrade pricing could sometimes 
rectify the problem and restore social efficiency.  However, we found the striking result that 
the vendor would at times forgo upgrade and instead use intertemporal price discrimination in 
equilibrium.  So, an upgrade policy is not a simple panacea to restore social efficiency, or to 
maximize the vendor’s profits (cf. Lee and Lee 1998; Fishman and Rob 2000). 
  Our theory applies to general business settings that involve decision making in view 
of an installed base of old products.  Examples include changes in internal management (new   4
management inheriting an installed base of old products from predecessors), mergers and 
acquisitions (acquirer inheriting an installed base from acquirees), and the exit of prominent 
competitors in a concentrated market (incumbent vendor facing an installed base created by 
the exited competitors).  The common features in these examples are that the vendors face an 
(exogenously formed) installed base of old products, and that the vendors have to make long 
term planning for all of their current / future products.
1 
  In particular, our theory may potentially shed some lights on why Sony’s PlayStation 
3 generated limited sales (in view of the more than 100 million units of PlayStation 2 that had 
been purchased by consumers), why Apple’s iPhone 3G was launched latter than iPhone 2G 
(perhaps to penetrate market segments who were contented with 2G cellular services), why 
the various generations of Apple iPod had little overlap in time (perhaps because static price 
discrimination using multiple product vintages was less profitable than a complete product 
replacement strategy), and why some automobile manufacturers launched new car models by 
offering discounts to early buyers (perhaps to exercise the type of perfect intertemporal price 
discrimination that we characterize in this study). 
Similarly, our findings could inform policy makers in facilitating efficient operations 
of markets with installed bases of old products.  The policy makers should assess the social 
implications of different product line and pricing strategies given that such strategies may 
interact with the existing installed bases, and evaluate if explicit measures, such as promoting 
product upgrades or replacements, could help regulate the pace of product consumption. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related literature.  
Section 3 presents the structure and assumptions of our research model.  Section 4 reports the 
analyses and characterizes the equilibria.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1  For example, when Lenovo acquired the personal computer division of IBM, it had to set future product line 
and pricing strategies by taking into account owners of existing IBM personal computers.  After the OS/2 was 
withdrawn from the operating systems market in 2006, Microsoft faced a sizable pool of potential customers 
who had been using the OS/2 in their computer systems, and who in due course may switch or upgrade to future 
versions of the Windows operating system.   5
2. Prior Literature 
This research is grounded on the extensive literature in durable goods monopoly and pricing.  
Two streams of work are particularly relevant.  The first is on market segmentation and price 
discrimination (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978; Stokey 1979; Moorthy 1984; Moorthy and Png 
1992).  The other is on planned obsolescence and product replacement strategies (e.g., Coase 
1972; Bulow 1982; 1986; Waldman 1993; 1996a; 1996b). 
  Research on market segmentation and price discrimination has demonstrated that if a 
monopolist is unable to identify consumers with heterogeneous valuations for quality, it may 
induce consumer self-selection by offering a menu of qualities, i.e., static price discrimination 
(Mussa and Rosen 1978; Moorthy 1984), or a sequence of prices for the same product over 
time, i.e., intertemporal price discrimination (Stokey 1979).  By integrating these two types of 
price discrimination, Moorthy and Png (1992) show that a monopolist vendor often would not 
sequentially sell a high quality product and then a low quality product to consumers unless 
cannibalization is significant, consumers are more impatient than the vendor, and the vendor 
is able to commit to its strategy.  Instead, it may prefer to immediately sell the entire product 
line to consumers.  Moorthy and Png’s setting does not allow consumers to buy both products 
over time (so they ruled out upgrade), and it exogenously fixes the product sequence.  Hence, 
their model imposes a stronger structure than the one presented here. 
  Along a similar vein, Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001) study how consumers react 
to multiple generations of the same durable product.  Their research suggests that in some 
cases the vendor would be better off postponing selling future generations of products, but 
they did not explicitly characterize such market equilibria.  Dhebar’s and Kornish’s models 
assume complete product replacement, viz., the vendor could only sell an old product in the 
first period and a new product in the second period.  Hence, their models could not account 
for static price discrimination and dynamic pricing of new products.   6
  Separately, research on planned obsolescence has focused on a vendor’s incentive to 
introduce a new product which causes economic or physical obsolescence of old products.  
The researchers typically assume that a new product would render an old product obsolete, 
but there exists a (often frictionless) second hand market which allows former patrons to sell 
their old stocks to other low valuation consumers (Bulow 1986; Levinthal and Purohit 1989; 
Waldman 1996a; 1996b).  Their interests mostly lie in how quality improvement and product 
substitutability affect the vendor’s strategies.  Accordingly, in these studies consumers would 
not own both the old and new products at the same time.  In fact, in most cases they do not 
incorporate either static or intertemporal price discriminations. 
  In a model incorporating product obsolescence and price discrimination, Lee and Lee 
(1998) characterize the time inconsistency problem caused by technological innovations, and 
they advocate the benefit of upgrade pricing which could help internalize the losses due to 
economic obsolescence.  In a more sophisticated analysis, Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) study 
a similar problem, but they further compare how information structure affects the vendor’s 
profitability.  They find that in general a frictionless second hand market is more profitable 
for the vendor (cf. no second hand market but with upgrade pricing). 
In both Lee and Lee’s (1998) and Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1998) settings, after the 
first period, an installed base of old products would form among high valuation consumers, 
which sets the stage for the analysis that we present in this paper.  However, their analyses do 
not allow for dynamic pricing of the new product, and so they are not able to study the time 
profile of consumer utilities.   
More importantly, their analyses cannot address questions related to the timing of the 
new product – the vendor can sell the new product only in one period, and so it could practice 
static price discrimination with either a product line or product replacement strategy, but not   7
intertemporal price discrimination with respect to the new product.  As we shall show below, 
this is an important restriction which limits the strategic insights of their studies.
2 
3. The Model 
A monopolist vendor is planning to sell a new generation of durable product in two periods, 
2 , 1 = t .  Before the arrival of this new product, the vendor (or its predecessors) has been 
selling an old generation, which results in an installed base of the old-generation product at 
the beginning of Period 1.  We index the old- and new-generation products by  } , { N O i∈ , 
and denote their qualities by  i q .  We assume that  O N q q >  due to technological innovations.  
For ease of exposition, we normalize  N q  to 1, and hence 0 1 ON qq < <= .   O q  then (inversely) 
measures the extent of quality improvement embodied in the new product. 
  Both the old (low-quality) and new (high-quality) products are of the same durability, 
2 ≥ n  periods.
3  We use  rate] interest  1 [ / 1 + = δ ,  1 0 < < δ , to denote a one-period discount 
factor, which is common to both the vendor and consumers.  The larger δ  is, the smaller the 
discount in future utilities will be.  We further assume zero fixed and marginal costs to focus 
on the strategic choices of the vendor in respond to demand variations. 
  On the demand side, there are two types of consumers indexed by  } , { L H j∈ , who 
differ in their valuations of product quality,  L H v v ≥ .  The high type segment has a size of 
H d , the low type segment has a size of  L d , and, without loss of generality,  1 = + L H d d .  Let 
L H
H
L v v v / =  measure consumer heterogeneity in valuations of product quality (Moorthy and 
Png 1992).  That is, larger 
H
L v  means that consumers are more “heterogeneous”.   
                                                 
2  For example, we found that in many cases the vendor would not sell the new product immediately.  That the 
vendor would sell new products as soon as they are available has been a major assumption in many past studies, 
especially those that do not endogenize R&D efforts, although some researchers have raised doubts on such an 
assumption (e.g., Fishman and Rob 2000; Kornish 2001). 
3  As we shall illustrate below, the vendor and consumers would rationally price the products by their physical 
lifespan, and so whether n is substantially longer than the planning horizon of two periods is not important.   8
  Each consumer demands at most one unit of either version of the product (they can, 
however, buy both products sequentially if they get higher utility from doing so; see, e.g., 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998).  Within its lifespan, the product provides a 
constant stream of service to consumers; once consumers buy it, they enjoy a “rental” value 
that equals its quality in each period of service until the product is retired.  Hence, each type j 
consumer values a product with quality  i q  and durability n at  ] 1 /[ ] 1 [ δ δ − −
n
i jq v , which is 
the discounted sum of rental values.  There is no second hand market;
4 as soon as consumers 
buy a new product, their old products are retired and provide no usage or residual value. 
  Each period further comprises two stages.  In the first stage, the vendor makes product 
and pricing announcements based on its knowledge of market demand.  In the second stage, 
consumers make purchase decisions, taking into account their valuations of the products and 
expectations about future products.  There is common knowledge on demand, product quality, 
durability, and technological innovations, and perfect information on the history of moves by 
the vendor and consumers.  We focus on rational expectations equilibria in which consumers 
form expectations about the vendor’s strategies, and the vendor fulfills such expectations (see, 
e.g., Stokey 1981; and Besanko and Winston 1990). 
  Prior to the beginning of Period 1, there is an existing installed base of the old product, 
the quantity of which is exogenously given.  In particular, we study two settings: one with a 
partly-covered installed base in which only high type consumers have bought the old product, 
and the other with a fully-covered installed base in which all consumers have bought the old 
product.
5  In the case with a partly-covered installed base, we further separate the analysis by 
whether the vendor can provide an upgrade option to consumers. 
                                                 
4  For a thorough analysis of the impact of a second hand market on the monopolist’s strategies, see Waldman 
(1996a) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1998). 
5  Intertemporal product line and pricing studies have typically found that consumers with higher valuations 
would buy a product first.  See, for example, Stokey (1979), Besanko and Winston (1990), Moorthy and Png 
(1992), Waldman (1996b), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Lee and Lee (1998), and Nahm (2004).   9
  We denote the price of product i in period t by 
i
t p , and the upgrade price of the new 
product by 
U




t p p = , as all consumers 
own the old product and hence share the same purchase history. 
4. Analysis 
For ease of presenting the subsequent results, we first define several constants: 
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4.1 Demand Characteristics 
If a consumer j does not own any product before making a purchase, then she can obtain the 
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The corresponding discounted utility at Period 1, 
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  Now, suppose the same consumer has bought the old product and has consumed it for 
one period at the beginning of Period 1.  Then, she would value only the incremental utility 
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1 − = δ .           ( 4 )    10
The first term on the right hand side of (3) is the value that the consumer obtains from the 
new product (recall that  1 = N q ).  The second term is the remaining consumption value of the 
old product given that it has been consumed for t periods.   
By (1) to (4), if  0 = O q , that is, if the consumer does not own the old product, then 
j j
Nt Nt ub =  and 
j j
Nt Nt UB = .  In this case, across Periods 1 and 2,  12
j j
ii bb = , but  12
j j
ii B B > .  That is, 
the consumer always obtains higher utility from an earlier purchase. 
Consider what happens if the consumer owns the old product prior to the beginning of 





N u u 2 1 < ), because depreciation of the old product raises the incremental benefit that 
she can obtain from the new product.  Second, by (4),  12
j j
NN UU >  if and only if  1
n
O q δ ≤− , 
and so the consumer obtains higher utility from an earlier upgrade if and only if the extent of 
quality improvement is high.  If the extent of quality improvement is low, her utility from 
upgrading to the new product again increases over time (i.e.,  12
j j
NN UU ≤ ).
6 
  By (2) and (4), the changes in consumer utility with respect to t,  
1
[] [1 ] [1 ]
0
1
n jj j tt
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,     (5) 
1
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.    (6) 
Denote  t U
j
t N Δ Δ /  as the marginal utility of waiting if a type j consumer delays upgrading to 
the new product.  Proposition 1 follows from the characteristics of (6). 
Proposition 1 (Consumer demand).  Suppose that a consumer owns the old product: 
                                                 
6  Previous studies of new product introduction and pricing (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998; 
Kornish 2001; Nahm 2004; Utaka 2006) typically assume that the new products are available only in the second 
(last) period, and hence they cannot capture this increasing “urge” of consumers to upgrade.  Fishman and Rob’s 
(2000) overlapping generation model implicitly captures this property, but they focused mostly on R&D choices 
and homogeneous consumers, and hence they did not provide insights on new product timing and pricing in the 
presence of price discrimination and market segmentation.   11
(i)  Her willingness to upgrade to the new product, 
j
Nt u , increases over time.  Further, 
her marginal utility of waiting increases in the quality of the old product,  O q . 
(ii)  If the extent of quality improvement is low ( 1
n
O q δ >− ), she obtains higher utility 
from delaying the upgrade to the new product. 
(iii)  A consumer with a higher valuation of product quality,  j v , is more sensitive to 
changes in upgrade timing. 
Figure 1 illustrates the net utility, 
j
t N U , that a consumer can obtain from upgrading to 
the new product over time.  Generally, the presence of the installed base of the old product 
reduces the opportunity “loss” that a consumer incurs from delaying the purchase of the new 
product.  If the quality of the old product is sufficiently high (i.e.,  1
n
O q δ >− ), the consumer 
benefits from postponing the upgrade. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
  Proposition 1 results from two forces in the demand dynamics: one is the former 
patrons’ increasing willingness to upgrade due to the depreciation of their old product, which 
increases their tendency to upgrade.  The other is their benefit from continuing to use the old 
product for longer periods (relative to getting the new product earlier).  This decreases their 
tendency to upgrade.  On balance, their net payoff is a function of the discount factor, extent 
of quality improvement, and durability.  If the quality of the old product is high, the second 
force would prevail, and consumers would delay their upgrade. 
  The following two sections consider how an installed base of the old product affects 
the purchase timing and pricing of the new product.   
4.2 Partly-Covered Installed Base 
Here we study a setting in which high type consumers have bought and used the old product 
for one period prior to the beginning of Period 1.  Since low type consumers do not own any   12
product at the beginning of the game, the monopolist vendor has to consider not only the 
timing and pricing strategies of the new product, but also, whether, when, and how much to 
sell the old product to low type consumers. 
Specifically, the vendor can sell the new product only in Period 1, only in Period 2, or 
in both periods, and it can offer premium pricing (a high price that is only affordable to one 
type of consumer), penetration pricing (a low price that is affordable to both consumer types), 
or intertemporal price discrimination (sell to consumers sequentially).  The vendor engages in 
delayed introduction if it chooses to sell the new product only in Period 2.
7   
Also, the vendor needs to decide whether to sell the old product to low types in Period 
1 or Period 2.  Table 1A summarizes all product line and pricing strategies (denoted as S1, 
S2, …, S7), and Table 1B presents the product sequences in each of these strategies.  Both 
Tables 1A and 1B exclude off-equilibrium strategies.
8 
[Insert Tables 1A and 1B here] 
  Following Proposition 1, Corollary 1.1 characterizes the demand given that only high 
type consumers own the old product prior to the beginning of Period 1. 
Corollary 1.1.  With a partly-covered installed base, low type consumers are more impatient 
than high type consumers when the extent of quality improvement is low ( 1
n
O q δ >− ), or 
their quality valuations are not too heterogeneous ( 3
H
L vV ≤ ).  If  1
H
L vV ≤ , low type consumers 
always get higher utility from the new product than high type consumers. 
Table 2 compares high and low type consumers’ utilities from the new product, given 
that only high type consumers own the old product.  Two things are worth noting: First, even 
without considering price, high type consumers would get more utility from the new product 
                                                 
7  In Moorthy and Png (1992), the vendor would never sell the old product before the new product because this 
would aggravate cannibalization.  However, as we shall show below, although our setting is similar to Moorthy 
and Png’s, on the condition that there is an existing (partly-covered) installed base of the old product, the vendor 
may sell the old product first because of different consumer purchase histories. 
8  Referring to the game tree presented in Appendix B, there are altogether 11 product line strategies, but four of 
them would not be chosen by the vendor in any parameterizations in equilibrium.   13
than low type consumers only when the heterogeneity in quality valuation is high enough to 
overcome the balking effect caused by their holdings of the old product.
9  Second, due to 
depreciation of the existing stocks, the relative utility of the two consumer types varies with 
purchase timing.  High type consumers could sometimes be less sensitive to purchase timing, 
and could get higher utility over time if the quality of the old product is high.  That is, they 
may prefer delaying the upgrade.  This never happens to low type consumers. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Neither of these findings would arise if all consumers share the same purchase history, 
i.e., if there is no pre-existing installed base of the old product, but, as we shall illustrate 
below, they lead to remarkable product line and pricing implications that have not been well 
explored in the literature.  We begin with the scenario when the monopolist vendor cannot 
offer an upgrade policy, the analysis of which may be of some independent interest as it 
corresponds to a problem involving intertemporal price discrimination by both valuations for 
quality and purchase history, but the vendor cannot use an upgrade policy to discriminate 
consumers by purchase history (cf. Lee and Lee 1998).  To our knowledge, this problem has 
not been analyzed in the previous literature.
10 
4.2.1 No Upgrade Policy 
In this section we suppose that the vendor cannot offer an upgrade discount to former patrons, 
perhaps because the administration cost of upgrade is too high, or because the vendor cannot 
identify former patrons.  So, all consumers must pay the same price for the new product.   
                                                 
9  In particular, if the heterogeneity is moderate (see the second column in Table 2), the preferences of the two 
consumer types “cross” over time – in Period 1, low type consumers get more utility from the new product than 
high type consumers, but this is reversed in Period 2.  This preference structure is possible only when there is an 
existing installed base of the old product, and when the vendor can vary the timing of the new product. 
10  Fishman and Rob (2000) study a similar problem with recurrent product innovations, no upgrade policy, but 
homogeneous consumers, and hence price discrimination is not an issue in their study.  Levinthal and Purohit 
(1989), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), and Nahm (2004) study a two-period product line and pricing problem 
with technological innovations and heterogeneous consumers, but they assume the existence of a frictionless 
second hand market and hence their consumers would never possess more than one product at the same time, i.e., 
there is no “economic obsolescence” (Lee and Lee 1998) in their studies.   14
  Since we assumed rational, forward looking consumers, and the vendor cannot make 
product and pricing commitments, we used backward induction to derive the equilibrium 
outcomes, the details of which are presented in Appendix B.  The pricing of the two products 
by the vendor is subject to several constraints.  First, the installed base of the (still functional) 
old product reduces the price that high type consumers are willing to pay for the new product.  
Second, since the vendor cannot price discriminate consumers by purchase history, if it wants 
to sell the new product to all consumers in the same period, it has to set a common (low) 
price even if low type consumers are willing to pay more (which is possible by Corollary 1.1).  
Third, the vendor may continue to sell the old product to low type consumers, the price of 
which would be restricted by the price of the new product.  The links between these pricing 
constraints produce a wide variety of equilibrium outcomes. 
In a similar setting with a partly-covered installed base and where the new product is 
sold for only one period, previous research has variously found (or sometimes assumed) that 
the vendor would always sell the new product to high valuation consumers when there exists 
a frictionless second hand market and the demand is continuous.  Whether the vendor would 
continue to sell the old product to low valuation consumers depends on demand distributions 
and the relative quality of the old and new products (Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Fudenberg 
and Tirole 1998; Kornish 2001; Nahm 2004; Sankaranarayanan 2007).    
In view of these findings, we ask two questions: Suppose that there is no second hand 
market and so consumers cannot resell their old products, and, the vendor can plan for both 
the old and new products over two periods (instead of one) with high type consumers already 
owning the old product.  Would the vendor always sell the new product immediately?  Would 
high type consumers always buy the new product before low type consumers?  
Interestingly, the next few propositions show that the answers to these two questions 
are sometimes “no”.   15
Proposition 2 (Infeasibility of restricting the new product to high types in Period 1).  If 
1
n
O q δ >− , the vendor would not sell the new product only to high type consumers (strategy 
S3) or sell the new product to high type consumers and old product to low type consumers 
(strategy S2) in Period 1. 
 Note  that  1
n
O q δ >−  would likely hold when the extent of quality improvement is not 
too high (i.e.,  O q  is not too small), the discount factor, δ , is not too small, and the number of 
period, n, is not excessively large.   
In fact, as we illustrate in Appendix B (Table B9), even if  1
n
O q δ ≤ − , there is only a 
small set of parameters in which strategies S2 and S3 could be optimal for the vendor.  These 
results imply that the common finding (or assumption), that the vendor would always sell the 
new product immediately only to some high type consumers (Levinthal and Purohit 1989; 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Kornish 2001; Nahm 2004), is often not tenable.  Further, on the 
condition that high type consumers own the old product prior to the beginning of the game, 
strategies such as “simultaneous introduction” (sell the old and new products in Period 1 to 
different consumers) or “sequential introduction” (sell the new product in Period 1 to high 
types and old product in Period 2 to low types) (Moorthy and Png 1992) which had received 
some attention in the literature may not be likely equilibrium outcomes.
11 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 (i.e., the difficulty of selling only to high types in 
Period 1) is as follows.  The vendor suffers from the classical time inconsistency problem in 
pricing the new product (Coase 1972); high type consumers would expect the vendor to sell 
                                                 
11  Notwithstanding the results in Proposition 2, it is worth pointing out that should the vendor choose strategy 
S3 when qO ≤ 1 – δ
n, the price of the new product would decrease over time.  High type consumers, despite 
already owning the old product, would still self-select to buy the new product at a higher price in Period 1.  This 
result is intriguing because previous studies have mostly suggested that if high valuation consumers already own 
the old product, without direct price discrimination, it is impossible for the vendor to charge them a new product 
price in excess of the regular price that it charges for low valuation consumers (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee 
and Lee 1998).  Here, with multiple periods, high type consumers may be so impatient that they would not want 
to wait for the cheaper price in Period 2 (i.e., they would not arbitrage even when it is technically feasible for 
them to do so).    16
the new product at lower price to low types in Period 2.  So, the vendor must reduce the price 
that it charges in Period 1 so as to let high type consumers keep some surplus.  This, however, 
would attract low type consumers to buy the new product in Period 1.   
To dissuade low type consumers from buying the new product in Period 1, the vendor 
could sell the old product to them at a very low price (the intuition here is similar to Moorthy 
and Png 1992), but this would reduce their need to buy the new product in Period 2.  Overall, 
if the vendor has an option to sell the new product later, it is difficult for it to restrict output 
to only high types or practice static price discrimination using different products in Period 1 
(despite high type consumers own the old product prior to the beginning of the game). 
Proposition 2 shows the importance of game structure in shaping previous findings – 
our model departs from previous studies in that we removed the assumption of the existence 
of a frictionless second hand market (cf. Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole 
1998; Nahm 2004), allowed the vendor to extend the decision horizon to beyond one period 
after the new product is introduced, and did not pre-set product sequences (cf. Moorthy and 
Png 1992; Dhebar 1994; Kornish 2001).  All of these points of departure are not unrealistic, 
but yet they lead to results that are distinctive from the previous literature. 
The next result has important theoretical and practical implications.  Instead of selling 
the new product to high type consumers first, the vendor may choose to sell only to low type 
consumers in Period 1, followed by high type consumers in Period 2.  More importantly, in 
some cases, this strategy extracts all consumer surplus. 
Proposition 3 (Perfect intertemporal price discrimination).  If and only if 
(i) 1
n
O q δ ≤−  and  1 2
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O q δ >−  and  12
H
L Vv V <≤ ,   17
the vendor would extract all surplus by selling the new product only to low type consumers in 
Period 1, followed by only high type consumers in Period 2 (strategy S4). 
Corollary 3.1.  When perfect intertemporal price discrimination occurs, the nominal price of 
the new product always increases over time.  The discounted price of the new product also 
increases over time if  1 /
H
L vV δ > . 
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows.  High type consumers already own the old 
product prior to Period 1, and so their utility for the new product does not drop too quickly (it 
can even increase when  1
n
O q δ >− ) over time.  If  1
H
L vV > , i.e., the valuations for quality are 
sufficiently different, the vendor would actually raise the price of the new product.  Low type 
consumers would buy in Period 1 despite getting negligible surplus because they would face 
an even higher price (and hence get negative surplus) in Period 2.   
Further, if  2
H
L vV ≤ , the possession of the old product reduces the need of high type 
consumers for the new product.  So, high type consumers are not willing to buy in Period 1 
although the price is lower than that in Period 2.  They would buy the new product in Period 
2 after their old product further depreciates, at the expense of paying a higher price.   
Taken together, the vendor could extract all consumer surplus even with self-selection 
and without any exogenous instrument for price discrimination.  This is because the existing 
installed base of the old product causes the preferences of low type and high type consumers 
to “cross” over time (see Figure 2), and consumers would self-select into the prices that help 
the vendor achieve perfect price discrimination. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Proposition 3 and Corollary 3.1 provide a new perspective for the paradoxical strategy 
of “limited period promotion for new customers”.  While some may variously attribute such a 
strategy to building a critical mass (Rogers 1995) or cultivating network effects (Katz and 
Shapiro 1986), our analysis shows that price discrimination could be an important underlying   18
reason behind such a strategy for products that feature recurrent technological innovations.  
The vendor may maximize its profit simply by setting the right price at the right time, without 
needing explicit price discrimination instruments. 
In the next proposition, we show that the vendor may deliberately postpone selling the 
new product. 
Proposition 4 (Delayed product introduction).  If and only if 
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the vendor would sell the new product only in Period 2 (strategies S6 and S7). 
Corollary 4.1.  Consumers always get zero surplus when delayed product introduction occurs. 
When consumers are homogeneous or there are relatively few high type consumers in 
the population (i.e., condition (i) in Proposition 4), the vendor would be better off not selling 
any product in Period 1.  Since high type consumers already own the old product, their utility 
from the new product is lower than that of low types, and so cannibalization would prevent 
the vendor from selling the new product to both consumer types in Period 1 (and, obviously it 
would not sell only to high types in this case too).  Similarly, if the vendor sells the new 
product only to low types in Period 1, they would envisage that the same product would be 
sold to high types in Period 2 at a lower price.  Hence they are reluctant to pay a high price in 
Period 1 (i.e., the Coase’s time inconsistency problem, but applying to low type consumers).  
To circumvent this, the vendor would deliberately delay selling the new product.   19
 On the other hand, if consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous (i.e., conditions (ii) 
and (iii) in Proposition 4), the vendor would focus on high type consumers.  But, if it sells the 
new product to high type consumers in Period 1, they would anticipate a reduced price in 
Period 2 and so be reluctant to pay a high price (the reasoning here is similar to that in 
Proposition 2, i.e., time inconsistency).  To overcome this, the vendor would delay selling the 
new product.  At the same time, because consumers are heterogeneous, the vendor can sell 
the old product to low type consumers without inducing significant cannibalization because 
high types already own the old product (it would, however, not sell the new product to low 
types because of both time inconsistency and cannibalization). 
It is instructive to observe that when the extent of quality improvement is low (i.e., 
1
n
O q δ >− ), with respect to Propositions 2 to 4, (a) the strategy of selling the new product to 
high types followed by low types ceases to be optimal in any parameterizations, (b) perfect 
intertemporal price discrimination becomes even more feasible, and (c) it is more likely for 
the vendor to delay selling the new product.  In general, when quality improvement is low, 
the vendor may shift its attention to low type consumers rather than high types, which is the 
underlying reason behind these observations. 
We next consider social efficiency.  An equilibrium is socially efficient if consumer 
utility is maximized given the cost of producing the items (Moorthy and Png 1992).  In our 
setting, the marginal cost of production is zero.  For each type j consumer, at the beginning of 
Period 1, her total utilities (including consumption of the old product) from getting the new 
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Subtracting  2
j U  from  1
j U ,  12
j j UU ≥  if and only if  1
n
O q δ ≤ − .  Hence, when the extent of 
quality improvement is high ( 1
n
O q δ ≤− ), social optimality requires selling the new product 
to both consumer types immediately in Period 1 (i.e., strategy S1).  Conversely, when the 
extent of quality improvement is low ( 1
n
O q δ >− ), social optimality requires selling the old 
product to low type consumers in Period 1, followed by the new product to all consumers in 
Period 2 (i.e., strategy S5).  Our next proposition follows. 
Proposition 5 (Social inefficiency).  For all: 
(i)   1
n
O q δ >− ; or 
(ii) 1
n
O q δ ≤− , and  3
H
LL vd V ≤ , 
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the vendor’s equilibrium strategies lead to socially inefficient outcomes. 
Corollary 5.1. For all conditions in case (ii), and when  1
n














high type consumers are inefficiently served in equilibrium. 
  Proposition 5 results mainly from time inconsistency and cannibalization.  When the 
extent of quality improvement is high ( 1
n
O q δ ≤ − ), consumers would prefer to enjoy the new 
product as soon as possible, but in most cases the vendor would prefer not to serve high type 
consumers in Period 1 because it can reap more profits from serving low type consumers first.  
Similarly, when  1
n
O q δ >− , profit maximization requires the vendor to sell the old product to 
low types in Period 1, but this would lead to the type of cannibalization similar to Moorthy   21
and Png (1992) in Period 2, and hence the vendor would prefer to sell the new product earlier 
than what social optimum would call for. 
  Previous research has mostly suggested that multiproduct firms would always serve 
high valuation consumers with efficient products or products with efficient qualities (see, e.g., 
Mussa and Rosen 1978; Moorthy 1984; Moorthy and Png 1992; Waldman 1996a).  However, 
Corollary 5.1 shows that once high valuation consumers own the old product and the vendor 
has two periods (instead of one) to sell the new product, it is possible for any consumer to be 
inefficiently served in equilibrium. 
4.2.2 With an Upgrade Policy 
We next consider the setting where the vendor can offer an “upgrade policy”, which allows 
consumers who own the old product to buy the new product at a cheaper price.
12  In general, 
the upgrade policy presents the vendor an extra instrument to exercise price discrimination 
based on purchase history (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998); the price of the 
new product is no longer constrained by the utility of consumers who do not possess the old 
product, and hence the vendor’s profit would (weakly) improve compared with the profits in 
the setting in which it cannot offer an upgrade policy. 
  In our setting, only high type consumers possess the old product at the beginning of 
Period 1.  The upgrade policy helps the vendor from two perspectives.  First, it can now make 
a credible threat to low type consumers that if they do not buy the old product in Period 1, 
they will face a high price of the new product in Period 2 (“high” in the sense that they would 
get zero surplus if they postpone their purchase until Period 2).  This credible threat would 
dissuade low type consumers from leapfrogging (i.e., skipping the old product in anticipation 
                                                 
12  Our upgrade policy setting corresponds to the one studied in Lee and Lee (1998), and the “semianonymous” 
case in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998).  The essential features are: (1) consumers must present the old product to 
purchase the new product at the upgrade price, and (2) consumers can arbitrage – if the upgrade price is too high, 
consumers who own the old product can pretend to be nonpatrons and buy the new product at the (lower) price 
meant for new patrons.    22
of the new product).  Hence, the upgrade policy eliminates the cannibalization of the old 
product by the (forthcoming) new product, and so improves the profitability of strategies that 
sell both products to consumers (e.g., strategies S2 and S5). 
  Second, upgrade allows high type consumers to reveal their purchase history if their 
incremental utility from the new product is lower than that of low types (which is possible by 
Corollary 1.1).  In this case, the vendor can differentiate low and high type consumers and 
charge low types a higher price for the new product if they do not possess the old product.  In 
other words, the upgrade policy facilitates both intra- and intertemporal price discriminations.  
Generally, we expect it to improve the profitability of strategies that sell the new product to 
all consumers when some of them do not own the old product (e.g., strategies S1 and S4). 
  We first examine the robustness of Propositions 2 to 5.
13  As we discussed above, the 
upgrade policy facilitates selling the old product to low type consumers and intra-temporal 
price discrimination, and so it does not particularly encourage the vendor to restrict the new 
product to high type consumers in Period 1.  Hence, Proposition 2 and the related discussions 
continue to apply, i.e., both S2 and S3 are off the equilibrium path when  1
n
O q δ >− .  They 
are equilibrium strategies only for a small set of parameters when  1
n
O q δ ≤ − . 
  Next, Proposition 3 concerns about perfect intertemporal price discrimination.  When 
1
n
O q δ ≤− , i.e., the extent of quality improvement is high, the vendor would prefer to sell the 
new product as soon as possible.  Previously, without upgrade policy, the (uniform) price of 
the new product is constrained by the utilities of both high and low type consumers, and so 
the vendor may exploit the dynamic changes in utilities – particularly the higher utility of low 
type consumers in Period 1 – in maximizing its profits. 
                                                 
13  For brevity, we do not present some of the following discussions as formal propositions or corollaries, and 
we omit the equilibrium parameterizations from the paper.  Interested readers may refer to Appendix B for the 
actual conditions in the equilibria.   23
  Now, with an upgrade policy, the vendor can effectively set different prices even in 
Period 1, which encourages selling the new product immediately to high types even though 
they enjoy a lower utility relative to low types.  Hence, it does not need to price discriminate 
against high types over time when  1
n
O q δ ≤ − .  Note that in this case the vendor earns even 
more profits by practicing intra-temporal (or static) price discrimination. 
 When  1
n
O q δ >− , i.e., the extent of quality improvement is low, the vendor would be 
better off letting high type consumers continue to use the old product, because, as explained 
in Proposition 3, their utility for the new product would increase over time.  Hence, perfect 
intertemporal price discrimination continues to be feasible.  The following corollary presents 
the new parameters for perfect intertemporal price discrimination to occur. 
Corollary 3.2.  With an upgrade policy, the vendor extracts all consumer surplus by selling 
the new product to low type consumers in Period 1 and to high type consumers in Period 2 
(strategy S4) if and only if  1
n
















.        ( 9 )  
  Given that the upgrade policy enables the vendor to charge different prices for the 
new product, the motivation behind condition (i) in Proposition 4, viz., the inability to set a 
high uniform price for the new product in Period 1, no longer holds.  So, when  1
n
O q δ ≤−  
and consumers are homogeneous, the vendor would immediately sell the new product at two 
different prices (i.e., there would not be delayed introduction). 
  However, when the extent of quality improvement is low, i.e.,  1
n
O q δ >− , although 
the vendor could still sell the new product to all consumers at different prices in Period 1, it 
would prefer selling the old product to low type consumers first.  The old product would 
allow low type consumers to buy the new product in Period 2 at a discounted price, while still 
enabling the vendor to earn a good profit from the new product in Period 2.  Since the extent   24
of quality improvement is low, the vendor would not suffer from the delayed revenue from 
the new product.  Hence, delayed product introduction continues to be a feasible equilibrium 
outcome when  1
n
O q δ >−  and consumers are relatively homogeneous. 
  Finally, when consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous (i.e., 
H
L v  is large), regardless 
of the extent of quality improvement, the similar reasoning after Proposition 4 for conditions 
(ii) and (iii) applies.  That is, the vendor would delay selling the new product until Period 2, 
and would sell the old product to low type consumers in Period 1 (i.e., strategies S5 or S6).  
The underlying motivation is time inconsistency. 
  Similar to the case with no upgrade policy, even if the vendor is able to implement an 
upgrade policy, when the extent of quality improvement is low ( 1
n
O q δ >− ), (a) the strategy 
of selling the new product to high types followed by low types cannot be optimal, (b) perfect 
intertemporal price discrimination becomes feasible in equilibrium, and (c) the vendor would 
more likely delay selling the new product.  In other words, all our major results continue to 
apply regardless of whether upgrade policy is used or not. 
  For social efficiency, since upgrade pricing facilitates selling the new product earlier, 
when the extent of quality improvement is high ( 1
n
O q δ ≤ − ), the vendor would always sell 
the new product to all consumers immediately when consumers are homogeneous ( 2
H
L vV ≤ ).  
That is, the equilibrium outcomes would be socially efficient.  When consumers are rather 
heterogeneous, however, the vendor would continue to postpone selling the new product to 
some consumers (see Table B18 in Appendix B).   
  On the other hand, when the extent of quality improvement is low ( 1
n
O q δ >− ), in 
various parameterizations the vendor would choose a strategy that leads to socially optimal 
outcomes (cf. Proposition 5 wherein the outcomes are always inefficient when  1
n
O q δ >− ).    25
Hence, upgrade policy could sometimes enhance social efficiency.  However, it may not be 
particularly good for some consumers, as we show in Corollary 5.2. 
Corollary 5.2.  With an upgrade policy, low type consumers always get zero surplus. 
  Nevertheless, although an upgrade policy enhances welfare and increases the vendor’s 
profits, it is not omnipotent.  In particular, when consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous so 
that  2
H
L vV > , the vendor cannot fully price in high type consumers’ incremental utility from 
the new product; in this case, high type consumers could arbitrage and conceal their purchase 
history.   So, consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and 
Lee 1998), there are parameterizations in which a uniform price for the new product would be 
imposed whether upgrade policy is used or not (e.g., when  1
n
O q δ ≤ −  and  2
H
L vV > ).  
  Departing from previous studies, however, in addition to setting a uniform price, the 
vendor could also exercise intertemporal price discrimination (strategy S3), delayed product 
introduction (strategy S6), or both intra- and intertemporal price discrimination by offering a 
low upgrade price to high type consumers while selling the entire product line to low types 
(strategy S2).  These strategies could help the vendor retain some price discrimination power 
when upgrade policy loses its merit in distinguishing consumers.  They are feasible primarily 
because the vendor has more than one period in selling the new product.   
Note, however, that this price discrimination power comes with a cost – they always 
cause some consumers to be inefficiently served, unlike the case when the vendor can only 
set a uniform price for the new product and sell it immediately (which is socially efficient 
when 1
n
O q δ ≤− ). 
4.2.3 Endogenizing Upgrade 
In general, the upgrade policy provides the vendor an extra instrument to price discriminate 
consumers, and so it leads to profits that weakly dominate those in the case with no upgrade   26
policy.  The vendor could either directly price discriminate consumers, or even if it does not, 
the upgrade policy serves as a credible threat to affect consumers’ purchase sequences.  The 
following proposition summarizes the impact of the upgrade policy: 
Proposition 6 (Use of Upgrade Policy). 
(i)   When  1
n
O q δ ≤ −  and  2
H
L vV ≤ , the vendor would use the upgrade policy and sell 
the new product in Period 1 to all consumers at different prices. 
(ii)   When  1
n
O q δ >−  and  
















  the vendor would offer the upgrade policy, but the upgrade option would not be 
exercised in equilibrium.  However, it causes low type consumers to buy the old 
product earlier and so helps the vendor to earn higher profits. 
  Nevertheless, timing may sometimes outperform the upgrade policy as an instrument 
to differentiate consumers.  Corollary 6.1 highlights this finding. 
Corollary 6.1.  For the parameters in (9), the vendor could use the upgrade policy to price 
discriminate consumers, but it would rather use intertemporal price discrimination instead of 
upgrade policy in equilibrium. 
Corollary 6.1 is the first result to show that a monopolist vendor may not exploit an 
explicit instrument for price discrimination, viz., upgrade policy, even when consumers are 
sufficiently homogeneous that renders price discrimination feasible.  This is caused by the 
combination of the installed base and the extended decision horizon in our model (cf. prior 
research which typically incorporates one decision period with no installed bases). 
4.3 Fully-Covered Installed Base 
In the presence of a fully-covered installed base, both high and low type consumers own the 
old product at the beginning of the game.  The vendor only needs to consider the timing and   27
pricing of the new product.  Unlike the case with partly-covered installed base, now the high 
type consumers’ reservation price for the new product is always higher than that of low type 
consumers in both periods.  Hence, they are more sensitive to changes in purchase timing (as 
characterized in Proposition 1). 
  In this case, high type consumers would always be served first.  Whether the vendor 
would choose penetration pricing, premium pricing, or intertemporal price discrimination 
depends on the extent of consumer heterogeneity, quality improvement, and the relative sizes 
of high type and low type populations.  However, in some extreme cases in which consumer 
valuations increase over time (mostly because the quality improvement of the new product is 
small), it is possible for the vendor to postpone selling the new product to all consumers.  The 
intuition here is essentially the “demand accumulation” effect (see, e.g., Dhebar 1994; and 
Kornish 2001) rather than time inconsistency as we discussed after Proposition 4. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We study the timing and pricing of a new product given that there has been an installed base 
of some old product, and the vendor can continue to sell the old product over time.  Instead of 
focusing on strategies such as buyback, upgrade, or reducing durability which mostly concern 
the old product (see, e.g., Bulow 1986; Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Waldman 1993; 1996a; 
1996b; Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Nahm 2004), we emphasize that the valuation of former 
patrons toward the new product is dynamic, and that it varies according to the characteristics 
of the consumers and product quality.  We show that some well-known results in the existing 
literature may not be robust in view of such dynamic valuation.   
Our results revitalize the importance of intertemporal price discrimination even when 
the vendor cannot directly identify and segment consumers (Stokey 1979).  In some cases, the 
vendor could increase the price of the new product over time while capturing all surplus from 
consumers.  Intertemporal price discrimination may also outperform upgrade pricing even   28
when the latter is practically feasible for the vendor.  We found that in a variety of cases the 
vendor would delay selling the new product.  Such delayed introduction is an effective way to 
address the time inconsistency problem in durable goods pricing.  Unfortunately, the vendor’s 
strategies often lead to socially undesirable consequences.   
How are our results relevant to real-life practices?  As mentioned earlier, we observe 
experiences of Sony, Apple, etc., that seem to be consistent with the strategic choices studied 
in this paper.  Further, Figure 3 plots the average prices of several consumer durables (home 
electrical appliances) over time in the United States.  While the prices of several products 
occasionally decreased, many of them increased over the years.  It is worth noting that the 
markets for these home durables tend to be quite concentrated.  So, the price increases could 
have happened because the vendors exercised their (intertemporal) pricing power in selling 
overlapping generations of these home durables.
14 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
  Similarly, it appears that delayed introduction of new products had occurred among 
some durable products.  For example, the technologies for wideband third-generation (3G) 
mobile telephone services had been available since many years ago, but to-date many service 
providers are still focusing their businesses on second-generation cellular services.  Some 
software vendors like Microsoft had been pushing back selling new versions of their software.  
While it was possible that the new products were not yet mature, it could well be that the 
vendors were maximizing profits by tackling time inconsistency and cannibalization through 
the kind of delayed introduction strategies that we proposed here.  
  The findings in this paper also suggest that policy makers could play a role to enhance 
social efficiency.  In particular, when the extent of quality improvement embodied in a new 
product is low, they should encourage consumers to retain their old products.  This could be 
                                                 
14  Figure 3 plots the nominal prices over time, but the inflation-adjusted price trends are similar.  Obviously, 
many alternative explanations may account for these increasing prices.  We present Figure 3 merely to illustrate 
that price increase over time is not uncommon in empirical markets of durable products.   29
achieved by increasing the transaction costs for selling the new product, or, in cases where 
the new product requires exclusive licenses (e.g., 3G cellular phones), by postponing granting 
the necessary licenses to the vendors.   
On the other hand, when the extent of quality improvement is high, the policy makers 
could encourage new product purchases by promoting trade-ins or using upgrade discounts 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 1998; Nahm 2004), or by levying higher taxes on 
using old products.  The latter approach is common for automobiles – in some countries, 
substantial tax discounts are offered for environment-friendly new cars (cf. old cars which are 
less fuel efficient and generate more pollution).  
  Future research may extend this study in several obvious ways.  First, an immediate 
question is whether our results are robust in a competitive market, or a market with new 
entrants.  Second, one could incorporate other factors, such as seasonal or myopic demands, 
asymmetric quality information, network effects, or positive marginal costs.  It may also be 
helpful to endogenize the formation of the installed base.  The challenge in these extensions 
lies in ensuring the tractability of the analysis since the vendor’s candidate timing and pricing 
strategies may increase exponentially.   
Finally, although we suggested some anecdotal examples that seem to be consistent 
with our theory, it is worthwhile to empirically test the implications of this research, e.g., the 
relationship between the extent of quality improvement and strategic choices of the vendor, 
using large-scale market data. 
   30
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Appendix A. 
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since  1 δ < .  (A1) and (A2) prove part (i).  Part (ii) is obvious from (6).  For part (iii), by (4), 
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t N . 




t N Δ Δ ≥ Δ Δ , i.e., the magnitude of the marginal utility of 
waiting is always larger for high type consumers.  [ ] 
Proof of Corollary 1.1.  If  2 Q qO > , it is obvious from (5) and (6) that 
0
LH






On the other hand, if  2 O qQ ≤  but  3
H
L vV ≤ , by (5) and (6) 












Finally, if  1
H
L vV ≤ , by (2) and (4), for all  2 t ≤ , 
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 .    [ ]   A2
Proof of Proposition 2.  Referring to Appendix B, Table B10, when  1
n
O q δ >− , both 
strategies S2 and S3 are eliminated from the set of equilibrium strategies.  [ ] 
Proof of Proposition 3.  Referring to the fifth row in Table B9, Appendix B, if  1
n
O q δ ≤− , 
then the vendor would choose strategy S4 (1: ; 2: NLNH →→ ) whenever  
11 2
[1 ]













−− −+ −− −
.   (A3) 
(The vendor would not choose strategy S4 in  12
H
L vV Φ <≤  not because it cannot perfectly 
price discriminate consumers, but because it would be better off selling the new product 
immediately to all consumers in Period 1). 
  Similarly, referring to the fourth row in Table B10, if  1
n
O q δ >− , the vendor would 
choose strategy S4 when  12
H
L Vv V <≤ , and it extracts all consumer surplus.   [ ] 


















L vV > .  Further,  21
NN p p δ >  if and only if  1 /
H
L vV δ > .   [  ] 
Proof of Proposition 4.  Referring to the first row in Tables B9 and B10, the vendor would 
choose strategy S7 (1: ; 2:NL − → ) whenever condition (i) holds.  Similarly, referring to the 
eighth and last rows in Table B9, and the last row in Table B10, the vendor would choose 
strategy S6 (1: ; 2: OL NH →→ ) when conditions (ii) and (iii) hold.  In all of these cases, 
the new product is sold only in Period 2.  [ ] 
Proof of Corollary 4.1  Trivial by the last column in Tables B9 and B10.       [ ] 
Proof of Proposition 5.  Referring to Table B10, strategy S5 (1: ; 2: & OL NH L →→ ) is 
not an equilibrium strategy in any parameterization.  Similarly, referring to Table B9, strategy   A3
S1 (1: & ; 2: NH L →− ) is not the equilibrium strategy in the parameterizations specified in 
condition (ii) of the Proposition.  [ ] 
Proof of Corollary 5.1.  For all the conditions in (ii), the vendor would not sell the new 
product to high type consumers in Period 1, which means that high types are inefficiently 
served.  Similarly, when  1
n














the vendor would prefer to sell the new product to high type consumers immediately in 
Period 1, which is not socially optimal.     [ ] 
Proof of Corollary 3.2.  Referring to the second row in Table B19, if  1
n
O q δ >− , then the 
















.  [  ]      (9) 
Proof of Corollary 5.2.  Trivial by the last column in Tables B18 and B19.   [ ] 
Proof of Proposition 6.  By comparing the vendor’s profit in the first row in Table B18 with 
those in the first six rows in Table B9, when  2
H
L vV ≤ , using (B17), we have 
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   A4
which completes the proof of part (i).  Part (ii) follows from the first row in Table B19 and 
the analysis before Table B13 in Appendix B.  [ ] 
Proof of Corollary 6.1.  The result is trivial from the second row in Table B19, and the 
analysis in Case 4.1 in Appendix B.    [ ] 
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Figure 2. Consumers’ willingness to purchase the new product when  2 1 V v V
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Figure 3.  Prices of consumer durables in the USA, 1998-2007Table 1A. Feasible equilibrium strategies (partly-covered installed base) 
TIMING of the new 
product 
The monopolist vendor’s strategies  PRODUCT 






Both products  -  S6  -  Premium pricing 
New product only  -  S7  - 




New product only  S1  -  - 
Both products  -  -  S2  High type followed 
by Low type  New product only  -  -  S3 































discrimination  Low type followed 
by High type  New product only  -  -  S4 
 
Table 1B. Equilibrium purchase sequences (partly-covered installed base) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7  Period
H L H L HLHLHLHLH L 
1  N  N  N  O N − −  N −  O −  O −  − 
2  −  −  −  N −  N N − N N N −  −  N 
Note: The “N” and “O” indicate whether the high type (H) and low type (L) consumers 
buy the new product and old product in a particular period in equilibrium. 
 
Table 2. Consumer utilities from the new product (partly-covered installed base) 
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